APPENDIX I - SUMMARY OF COE STANDARDS RELEVANT TO THE PROJECT, IN PARTICULAR AS REGARDS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY

1. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

The independence of the judiciary has both an objective component, as an indispensable characteristic of the institution of the judiciary, and a subjective component, as the right of an individual to have his/her rights and freedoms determined by an independent judge. Without independent judges there can be no correct and lawful implementation of rights and freedoms. Consequently, the independence of the judiciary is not a personal privilege of the judges, but justified by the need to enable judges to fulfil their role of guardians of the rights and freedoms of the people.

Institutional rules have to be designed in such a way as to guarantee the selection of highly qualified and personally reliable judges and to define settings in which judges can work without being subject to undue external influence.

At European level, the right to an independent and impartial tribunal is first of all guaranteed by **Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights** *("1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. …").* The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) sheds light on a number of important aspects of judicial independence and impartiality.

When deciding whether a tribunal is independent, the ECtHR considers:

- the manner of appointment of its members
- the duration of their office
- the existence of guarantees against outside pressures, and
- the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence (Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, para. 78)

The Court has held that the tribunal must be independent of both the executive and the parties (Ringeisen v. Austria, 16 July 1971, para. 95). The Court has held that the presence of judicial or legally qualified members on a tribunal is a strong indication of its independence (Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 23 June 1981, para. 57).

The fact that the members of a tribunal are appointed by the executive does not in itself violate the Convention (Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, para. 79.) For there to be a violation of Article 6, the applicant would need to show that the practice of appointment as a whole was unsatisfactory or that the establishment of the particular tribunal deciding a case was influenced by motives suggesting an attempt to influence its outcome (Zand v. Austria, 15 DR 70, para. 77).

Further, if the members of a tribunal are appointed for fixed terms, this is seen as a guarantee of independence. In the case of Le Compte v. Belgium, from 1981, fixed six-year terms for Appeal Council members were found to provide a guarantee of independence.

The Court held in Piersack v. Belgium, from 1982, that whilst impartiality normally denotes absence of prejudice or bias, its existence or otherwise can, notably under Article 6 (1) of the Convention, be tested in various ways. A distinction can be drawn in this context between a subjective approach, that is endeavouring to ascertain the personal conviction of a given judge in a given case, and an objective approach, that is determining whether he or she offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.

For an allegation of subjective impartiality to be made out, the Court requires proof of actual bias. Personal impartiality of a duly appointed judge is presumed until there is evidence to the contrary (Hauschildt v. Denmark). This is a very strong presumption and in practice it is very difficult to prove personal bias. In Lavents v. Latvia , from 2002, the Court criticised the presiding judge for making comments about the case to the press before the trial had been concluded. The requirement of impartiality was violated by the judge referring to the possibility of conviction or partial acquittal but leaving out the possibility of total acquittal.

As to the objective test, the Court stated in Fey v. Austria that under the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite apart from the judge's personal conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his or her impartiality. In this respect even appearances may be of a certain importance. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public and, above all, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, in the accused. This implies that in deciding whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular judge lacks impartiality, the standpoint of the accused is important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be held to be objectively justified (Fey v. Austria, 24 February 1993).

The Court has made clear that any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear lack of impartiality must withdraw (Piersack v. Belgium, para. 30, Nortier, para. 33, Hauschildt, para. 48.)

Apart from the European Convention on Human Rights, the most authoritative text on the independence of the judiciary at the European level is **Recommendation (94) 12 on the independence, efficiency and role of judges** (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13 October 1994)[1]

The Recommendation calls upon the member States to adopt or reinforce all measures necessary to promote the role of judges and strengthen their efficiency and independence. It contains six principles which should be applied by the governments of member States. These principles relate to the independence of judges, the authority of judges, proper working conditions, the right to form associations, judicial responsibilities and the consequences of failure to carry out responsibilities and disciplinary offences.

The starting-point for the Recommendation is the idea that the powers conferred on judges are counterbalanced by their duties. It is necessary to give judges appropriate powers guaranteeing their independence. However, such powers do not authorise them to act in an arbitrary manner, as judges are also subject to certain duties. Judicial responsibilities are accordingly determined by the relationship between the powers and the duties of judges. With

[1]https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=534553&SecMode=1&DocId=514386&Usage=2

the same aim of preserving the independence of judges, it is essential to make judges subject to a system of supervision which makes sure that their rights and duties are respected.

Since the text of the recommendation does not go into detail, a number of attempts were made for a more advanced text on the independence of the Judiciary. Probably the most comprehensive text is Opinion No. 1 of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) on standards concerning the independence of the judiciary and the irremovability of judges[2]. Other Opinions of the CCJE are also relevant in this context, e.g. CCJE Opinions no. 6 on Fair Trial within a Reasonable Time[3], no. 10 on the Council for the Judiciary in the Service of Society[4] and no. 11 on the Quality of Judicial Decisions[5].

As for **Opinion No. 1 of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE)**, first of all, the CCJE emphasised that what is critical is not the perfection of principles and, still less, the harmonisation of institutions, but the putting into full effect of principles already developed.

Secondly, the Opinion deals with the rationales of judicial independence, the level at which judicial independence is guaranteed, the basis of appointment or promotion, appointing and consultative bodies, tenure - period of appointment, tenure - irremovability and discipline, remuneration, freedom from undue external influence, independence within the judiciary and the judicial role.

The CCJE recommended that the authorities responsible in member States for making and advising on appointments and promotions should introduce, publish and give effect to objective criteria, with the aim of ensuring that the selection and career of judges are based on merit, having regard to qualifications, integrity, ability and efficiency**.** Once this is done, those bodies or authorities responsible for any appointment or promotion will be obliged to act accordingly, and it will then at least be possible to scrutinize the content of the criteria adopted and their practical effect. Seniority should not be the governing principle determining promotion. Adequate professional experience is however relevant, and pre-conditions related to years of experience may help to support independence. The CCJE considered that every decision relating to a judge's appointment or career should be based on objective criteria and be either taken by an independent authority or subject to guarantees to ensure that it is not taken other than on the basis of such criteria.

The CCJE considered that when tenure is provisional or limited, the body responsible for the objectivity and the transparency of the method of appointment or re-appointment as a full-time judge are of special importance. The CCJE noted that the irremovability of judges should be an express element of the independence enshrined at the highest internal level, that the intervention of an independent authority, with procedures guaranteeing full rights of defence, is of particular importance in matters of discipline and that it would be useful to prepare standards defining not just the conduct which may lead to removal from office, but also all conduct which may lead to any disciplinary steps or change of status, including for example a move to a different court or area. Judges' remuneration should be commensurate with their role and responsibilities and should provide appropriately for sickness pay and retirement pay.

Judges in different States could benefit from discussing together and exchanging information about particular issues. The independence of any individual judge in the performance of his or her functions exists irrespective of any internal court hierarchy. The use of statistical data and the court inspection systems shall not serve to prejudice the independence of judges.

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[2]http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/texts/JD_docs/CCJE_Opinion_1_E.htm

[3]https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CCJE(2004)OP6&Sector=secDGHL&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=FEF2E0&BackColorIntranet=FEF2E0&BackColorLogged=c3c3c3

[4]https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CCJE(2007)OP10&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=FEF2E0&BackColorIntranet=FEF2E0&BackColorLogged=c3c3c3

[5]https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CCJE(2008)OP11&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=FEF2E0&BackColorIntranet=FEF2E0&BackColorLogged=c3c3c3

Another Council of Europe text is the **European Charter on the statute for judges**. The Charter endeavours to define the content of the statute for judges on the basis of the objectives to be attained: ensuring the competence, independence and impartiality which all members of the public are entitled to expect of the courts and judges entrusted with protecting their rights.

The Charter further underlines that the fundamental principles constituting a statute for judges, determining the safeguard on the competence, independence and impartiality of the judges and courts, must be enacted in the normative rules at the highest level, that is to say in the Constitution, in the case of European states which have established such a basic text. The requirement to enshrine the fundamental principles and rules in legislation or the Constitution protects the former from being amended under a cursory procedure unsuited to the issues at stake.

The Charter also provides for the intervention of a body independent from the executive and the legislature where a decision is required on the selection, recruitment or appointment of judges, the development of their careers or the termination of their office. The Charter states that judges who are members of the independent body should be elected by their peers, on the grounds that the requisite independence of this body precludes the election or appointment of its members by a political authority belonging to the executive or the legislature.

The Charter enshrines the "right of appeal" of any judge who considers that his or her rights under the statute or more generally independence, or that of the legal process, is threatened or infringed. It further sets out the judge's main duties in the exercise of his or her functions. The State has the duty of ensuring that judges have the means necessary to accomplish their tasks properly, and in particular to deal with cases within a reasonable period. Finally, the Charter recognises the role of professional associations formed by judges.

One of the recent CoE documents of high relevance concerning the independence of the judiciary is the **Report on the Independence of the Judicial System** (Part I: Independence of Judges).[6]

The Report underlines that the basic principles relevant to the independence of the judiciary should be set out in the Constitution or equivalent texts. These principles include the judiciary's independence from other state powers, that judges are subject only to the law, that they are distinguished only by their different functions, as well as the principles of the natural or lawful judge pre-established by law and that of his or her irremovability. All decisions concerning appointment and the professional career of judges should be based on merit applying objective criteria within the framework of the law. Rules of incompatibility and for the challenging of judges are an essential element of judicial independence.

It is an appropriate method for guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary that an independent judicial council has decisive influence on decisions on the appointment and career of judges. While respecting the variety of legal systems existing, the Venice Commission recommends that states not yet having done so consider the establishment of an independent judicial council. In all cases the council should have a pluralistic composition, with a substantial part if not the majority of the members being judges. With the exception of ex-officio members, these judges should be elected or appointed by their peers.

According to the Report, ordinary judges should be appointed permanently until retirement. Probationary periods for judges are problematic from the point of view of their independence.

[6]Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 82nd Plenary Session (Venice, 12-13 March 2010) http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD(2010)004-e.asp

Judicial councils, or disciplinary courts, should have a decisive influence in disciplinary proceedings. The possibility of an appeal to a court against decisions of disciplinary bodies should be provided for.

A level of remuneration should be guaranteed to judges that corresponds to the dignity of their office and the scope of their duties. Bonuses and non-financial benefits for judges, the distribution of which involves a discretionary element, should be phased out.

As regards the budget of the judiciary, decisions on the allocation of funds to courts should be taken with the strictest respect for the principle of judicial independence. The judiciary should have the opportunity to express its views about the proposed budget to Parliament, possibly through the judicial council.

Judges should not put themselves into a position where their independence or impartiality may be questioned. This justifies national rules on the incompatibility of judicial office with other functions and is also a reason why many states restrict the political activities of judges.

States may provide for the incompatibility of the judicial office with other functions. Judges shall not exercise executive functions. Political activity that could interfere with the impartiality of judicial powers should not be authorised.

Judicial decisions should not be subject to any revision outside the appeals process, in particular not through a protest of the prosecutor or any other state body outside the time limit for an appeal.

In order to shield the judicial process from undue pressure, one should consider the application of the principle of *"sub judice",* which should be carefully defined, so that an appropriate balance is struck between the need to protect the judicial process on the one hand and freedom of the press and open discussion of matters of public interest on the other.

The principle of internal judicial independence means that the independence of each individual judge is incompatible with a relationship of subordination of judges in their judicial decision-making activity.

As an expression of the principle of the natural or lawful judge pre-established by law, the allocation of cases to individual judges should be based on objective and transparent criteria established in advance by the law or by special regulations on the basis of the law, e.g. in court regulations. Exceptions should be motivated.

Even if the independence of the prosecutors is not identical to the one judges must enjoy, the CM **Recommendation (2000)19**[7]**, on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system** calls upon member states to take measures to ensure that the recruitment, the promotion and the transfer of public prosecutors are carried out according to fair and impartial procedures embodying safeguards against any approach which favours the interests of specific groups, and exclude discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth, or other status.

The careers of public prosecutors, their promotions and their mobility should be governed by published and objective criteria, such as competence and experience; in particular, the mobility of public prosecutors should be governed also by the needs of the service.

[7]Adopted on 6 October 2000, see:
https://wcd.coe.int//ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Rec(2000)19&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75

2. JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Several CoE documents concern the accountability and transparency of the judiciary. It cannot be stressed enough how important these two elements are for an independent, well-functioning and trusted judiciary. As mentioned above under the Chapter "CoE standards regarding the independence", independence is not an end in itself but is counterbalanced by the exercise of judicial duties. If these duties are not exercised properly, disciplinary sanctions with all due safeguards for judicial independence set forth by European standards mentioned under the Chapter "Independence" may apply. This shows the close interaction between independence and accountability. In addition, according to modern trends, the judiciary needs to evolve from an inward oriented organisation to a system which is open to the external world.

One of the important topics within transparency and accountability concerns the relationship between the media and the judiciary. Some aspects of this topic are covered by the **Recommendation Rec(2003)13 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings**[8].

The recommendation provides guidelines for public authorities in the light of Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Its main focus is on the right of the media to report about criminal proceedings. A set of common principles for the protection of freedom of the media, as well as other fundamental rights of individuals at stake before, during and after criminal proceedings, was included in the Recommendation.

With regard to the information of the public via the media, the Recommendation provides that the media have a particular role in disseminating information to the public, since they should be able to disseminate information about the activities of judicial authorities and police services. The media has thus the right to freely report and comment on the functioning of the criminal justice system.

As regards to presumption of innocence, Article 6 § 2 of the ECHR guarantees the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. This principle implies that the opinions and information relating to on-going criminal proceedings should only be communicated or disseminated through the media where this does not prejudice the presumption of innocence of the suspect or accused.

With regard to access to information, judicial authorities and police services should provide to the media only verified information or information which is based on reasonable assumptions. When journalists have lawfully obtained information in the context of on-going criminal proceedings from judicial authorities or police services, those authorities should make available such information to all journalists who make the same request.

The Recommendation also provides for the prohibition of the exploitation of information for commercial purposes and for the protection of privacy in the context of criminal proceedings, as well as for the right of correction or the right of reply.

The principle of prevention of prejudicial influence recommends that judicial authorities and police services should abstain from publicly providing information which bears a risk of substantial prejudicial influence to the fairness of the proceedings. Where the accused can show that the provision of information is highly likely to result, or has resulted, in a breach of his or her right to a fair trial, he or she should have an effective legal remedy.

[8]Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 July 2003 at the 848th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies.

The Recommendation also provides for a free admission of journalists to the proceedings and their access to courtrooms. It further concerns the possibility of live reporting and recordings in courtrooms and provides for support for media reporting by the judicial authorities.

Finally, the Recommendation provides for the protection of witnesses and advocates so that the identity of witnesses should not be disclosed, unless a witness has given his or her prior consent, the identification of a witness is of public concern, or the testimony has already been given in public.

The **European Guidelines on ethics and conduct for public prosecutors: "The Budapest Guidelines"**[9] provide for standards on ethics and conduct for public prosecutors.

Public prosecutors play a key role in the criminal justice system and in some jurisdictions are assigned other tasks as general upholders of legality. The guidelines on ethics and conduct for public prosecutors set out standards of conduct and practice expected of all prosecutors working for or on behalf of a public prosecution service. The guidelines contain recommendations for basic duties of prosecutors, professional conduct in general, professional conduct in the framework of criminal proceedings and the private conduct of prosecutors.

Equally relevant to the accountability and transparency principles is the CM **Recommendation (2000)19**[10]**, on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system**.

This Recommendation calls upon member states to take effective measures to guarantee that public prosecutors are able to fulfil their professional duties and responsibilities under adequate legal and organisational conditions. Such conditions should be established in close co-operation with the representatives of public prosecutors. Adequate budgetary means should be put at the disposal of public prosecutors to allow them to carry out their duties properly.

Disciplinary proceedings against public prosecutors should be governed by law and should guarantee a fair and objective evaluation and decision, which in turn should be subject to independent and impartial review. Furthermore, public prosecutors should have access to a satisfactory grievance procedure, including where appropriate access to a tribunal, if their legal status is affected.

Finally, public prosecutors should have reasonable conditions of service such as remuneration, tenure and pension commensurate with their important role as well as an appropriate age of retirement and that these conditions should be governed by law.

3. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY

The European standards concerning the efficiency of the judiciary coincide to a certain extent with those on independence, since the two fields are closely interrelated. The **Recommendation (94) 12 on the independence, efficiency and role of judges**[11], provides for some important principles regarding the efficiency of the judiciary (see above).

[9] http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccpe/conferences/cpge/2005/CPGE_2005_05LignesDirectrices_en.pdf
[10] Adopted on 6 October 2000, see: https://wcd.coe.int//ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Rec(2000)19&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75
[11] https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=534553&SecMode=1&DocId=514386&Usage=2

Another European document which is worth mentioning in this respect is the **Recommendation (86) 12 concerning measures to prevent and reduce the excessive workload in the courts**[12]. Although the document was adopted in 1986, its provisions are still relevant for modern court systems.

In Recommendation (86) 12, the CoE Committee of Ministers invited the governments of member states to consider the advisability of pursuing the following objectives as part of their judicial policy: encouraging, where appropriate, a friendly settlement of disputes; not increasing but gradually reducing the non-judicial tasks entrusted to judges by assigning such tasks to other persons or bodies; providing for bodies which, outside the judicial system, shall be at the disposal of the parties to solve disputes on small claims and in some specific areas of law; taking steps to make arbitration more easily accessible and more effective as a substitute measure to judicial proceedings; generalising trial by a single judge at first instance in all appropriate matters; reviewing at regular intervals the competence of the various courts as to the amount and nature of the claims in order to ensure a balanced distribution of the workload; evaluating the possible impact of legal insurance on the increasing number of cases brought to court, and taking appropriate measures should it be established that legal insurance encourages the filing of ill-founded claims.

Today, the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) can facilitate the work of courts and save time for court administration. **Recommendation (2001) 2 concerning the design and re-design of court systems and legal information systems in a cost-effective manner** addresses this issue[13] and invites CoE member states to acknowledge the importance of ICT to the judicial administrative process.

As the electronic technologies influence the process of modernisation of justice systems and of legal information systems, the challenge is "to harness the potential of ICTs to transform the associated processes to achieve improvements in both efficiency and effectiveness. This implies more than simply automating existing manual procedures and processes. It involves the redesign or re-engineering of processes and a significant commitment to exploiting the potential of electronically stored data to provide faster and better information with which to manage the dispensation of justice and the provision of services to users". The introduction of the new technology should ensure that an up-to-date and cost-efficient organisation of systems will lead to better and broader service at a reasonable cost in the justice system.

It should be noted that an ICT strategy for the courts needs to take careful account of the distinctive requirements and expectations of a judicial system. Decision-making also needs to be based on clear principles and aims that properly reflect those requirements and expectations. In this light, the following checklist regarding the investment in ICTs was produced: cost efficiency; speed of justice; contextualisation; quality of justice; uniformity of service; transparency of procedures; verification of decisions; management information; deployment of personnel; simpler and more standardised systems; support to users; capacity-building; security; integrity.

The choice of either option presents advantages and disadvantages, and may also vary from one member state to another (for example geographical size, traditions and capacities). In the annex to Recommendation (2001) 2, advantages and disadvantages of different options are analysed.

[12]Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 16 September 1986
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=606796&SecMode=1&DocId=690980&Usage=2
[13]Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 February 2001.

Legal tools such as legal aid and mediation are of utmost relevance to the efficiency of the judicial systems. These two tools have been examined and certain standards introduced by the CoE as well.

The right to legal aid is a fundamental right recognised by the Council of Europe. It is particularly governed by the **Resolution (76) 5 on Legal Aid in Civil, Commercial and Administrative Matters**[14] and the **Resolution (78) 8 on Legal Aid and Advice**[15].

The first resolution recommends, *inter alia,* that the governments of member states accord, under the same conditions as to nationals, legal aid in civil, commercial and administrative matters, irrespective of the nature of the tribunal exercising jurisdiction:

a. to natural persons being nationals of any member state;

b. to all other natural persons who have their habitual residence in the territory of the state where the proceedings take place.

The main statement of the Resolution (78) 8 on Legal Aid and Advice is that no one should be prevented by economic obstacles from pursuing or defending their right before any court determining civil, commercial, administrative, social or fiscal matters. To this end, all persons should have a right to necessary legal aid in court proceedings.

The role of mediation is highlighted in the CoE **Recommendation (98) 1 on Family Mediation**[16], **Recommendation (99) 19 concerning Mediation in Penal Matters**[17] and **Recommendation (2002) 10 on Mediation in Civil Matters**[18].

The purpose of Recommendation (98) 1[19] on Family Mediation is to encourage the introduction, promotion or strengthening in member states of family mediation (a process to resolve family disputes in a consensual manner, aiming at reducing conflict in the interest of all the members of the family).

Recommendation (99) 19[20] concerning Mediation in Penal Matters covers a definition of mediation in penal matters ("victim/offender mediation", as a complement to traditional criminal justice proceedings) and sets out guiding principles to be considered in the development of existing mediation schemes, as well as in the introduction of new ones.

Recommendation (2002) 10[21] on Mediation in Civil Matters deals with mediation in matters involving civil rights and obligations, including matters within the remit of commercial, consumer and labour law, but excluding administrative or penal matters. It is without prejudice to the provisions of Recommendation (98) 1 on family mediation.

Within the Directorate of Co-operation of the CoE the following institutions promote the efficiency of justice and deal with a series of specific issues related to this subject:

a. the European Commission for efficiency for justice, CEPEJ;

[14]Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 18 February 1976 http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/administrative_law_and_justice/Texts_&_Documents/Conv_Rec_Res/Resolution(76)5.asp
[15]Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 2 March 1978 http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/administrative_law_and_justice/texts_&_documents/Conv_Rec_Res/Resolution(78)8.asp
[16]https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=1153972&SecMode=1&DocId=450792&Usage=2
[17]https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=420059&Site=CM
[18]https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=306401&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75
[19]Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 21 January 1998.
[20]Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 15 September 1999.
[21]Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 18 September 2002.

b. the Consultative Council for European judges, CCJE;

c. the Consultative Council of European prosecutors, CCPE;

d. the training of European judges and prosecutors, the Lisbon network[22].

A comprehensive list of "Minimum Corpus of the CoE standards", including CoE conventional acquis, CoE non-conventional acquis, Opinions of the CCJE, CCPE and Recommendations of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) can be found on http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/rapports/RL-BU_2008_2MinimumCorpus_en.pdf

[22]For more information about these institutions: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/overview_cooperation_en.asp